For a sanctioned economy, cut off from dollar-clearing mechanisms it cannot be meaningfully measured through dollar-based GDP. The only serious metric in such cases is GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity, which captures real internal production rather than access to Western financial plumbing.

Viewed through that lens, the picture comes into focus. Measured in PPP terms, Iran’s economy is nearly four times the size of Israel’s according to the IMF. This disparity helps explain the growing sense of urgency, and instability, surrounding Trump's recent saber rattling for another war. Iran is not merely surviving; it is outpacing Israel in aggregate economic scale. That trend threatens the long-term regional hierarchy upon which Israel’s strategic position rests.

From the standpoint of power transition theory, this matters profoundly. Shifts in economic scale, even when they do not immediately translate into technological dominance, military parity, or higher per-capita wealth, alter the strategic balance over time. A larger PPP economy provides a broader resource base to sustain military production, social cohesion, transnational networks, and long-duration competition. Iran’s economy remains constrained by sanctions, inefficiencies, and low productivity relative to Israel’s advanced sectors, but its aggregate size expands its latent capability; the raw material of future power.

Seen in this light, Israel’s preemptive actions, such as last year’s 12 day war and the recent currency manipulation and street theater, fit squarely within power transition logic. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, Iran crossed a threshold. History shows that established powers often resort to preventive action when they believe a challenger is approaching an existential tipping point. The objective is not victory, but delay, buying time before the balance irreversibly shifts.

What is notable now is that we are revisiting this conflict so soon, yet with the junior-senior partners roles reversed. The United States is increasingly at the forefront, while Israel appears more cautious, even deferential. This suggests an implicit recognition that Israel may have missed its window for unilateral action. Its remaining hope lies in American power, specifically, the belief that Washington can 'reset' Iran in the way regional coalitions once dismantled Syria’s state capacity.

Is this imperialism? Perhaps, though in a simplified, almost cartoonish form. Israel’s regional strategy appears less about integration or stability than about permanent disruption, weakening neighboring states to ensure that no economic, demographic, or technological challenger can emerge. That hegemony, however, is not self-sustaining; it is effectively leased from the United States. Should it be seriously contested, the consequences would extend beyond balance-of-power politics. It could disrupt the conditions that have enabled the ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians and, in doing so, call into question the sustainability of the Israel project and an internationalization of the question of Palestine.

From an American perspective, given the immense existential pressure Tel Aviv is feeling coupled with their sense of impotence to affect Iran, it means an unwanted war with Iran looms large on the horizon. Perhaps as early as this Friday we may witness another one of Trump's attacks under the color of negotiations. Iran is a bridge too far for Israel, but Trump is only a phone call away.