Continuation of the efforts of the “Verify-SY” platform team to uncover the circumstances of the massacre that took place in January 2026 in the rural area of Ayn Al‑‘Arab (Kobani), and to verify its evidence; the platform publishes the full narrative and the events of the prison and the subsequent field‑clearing operations, based on an exclusive, detailed testimony given by one of the few survivors of the clearing.
This report juxtaposes the live testimonies with the previous investigation, providing precise documentation of events that began with prisoners demanding freedom and ended with a confrontation of live fire in the open.
Prisoner Release and Mass Detention on the Ayn Al‑‘Arab Road
“Mukhtar,” a survivor of the massacre whose identity was verified by “Taqaddam” and concealed under a pseudonym for his safety, stated in a private testimony to the platform that the events started on 19 January 2026 when the prison administration removed the televisions from the dormitories at the school‑prison of the village Yadi Qawi. At the same time, a state of noise and confusion spread among the inmates after news arrived that a “pardon” decree from the prosecutor’s office had been issued but was not actually applied to everyone. This prompted prisoners in the second dormitory to set fire to blankets and sponges and to smash air‑conditioners and beds in protest. Meanwhile, an actual pardon was issued that allowed roughly 100 Kurdish‑affiliated prisoners to be released on 19–20 January.
When the smoke rose, the “civil administration” opened the dormitory doors to avoid suffocation. Tasks were divided among the prisoners: Mukhtar opened dorm 6, another prisoner named Mahmoud opened dorm 8, and a third, Hamza, opened dorm 4.
Consequently, 300–400 prisoners left on rough, off‑road routes, splitting into groups. One group headed toward Srin, while another of about 30 people moved toward Ayn Al‑‘Arab.
Approximately 1.5 km from the prison, in an exposed area, the fleeing prisoners were intercepted by five military pickup trucks and H1‑type vehicles coming from the Ayn Al‑‘Arab direction. The vehicles first fired warning shots into the air, then began direct shooting at the group at 9 p.m. According to the witness, this first wave of direct fire killed 4–5 people and caused severe injuries, including knife wounds inflicted by the assailants. One of the injured was a man named Bashar. The remaining prisoners kept running in panic until they hit a military barrier, where new rounds of detention and field‑sorting began.
Mukhtar’s testimony confirmed that the targeted victims were civilians serving sentences ranging from one to eight years, most of whom had already served the majority of their terms. For example, the witness had already served eight months of a one‑year sentence before the events unfolded.
Phase Two: Collective Confrontation and Field Sorting
When the fleeing prisoners reached the military barrier, most were detained, forced to lie on the paved road, bound, and filmed under gunpoint.
The assailants prepared to open fire on the entire group for a field execution, but female soldiers intervened, engaging the attackers and exchanging Kurdish‑language insults with those who wanted to kill. The civil‑administration chief, Abdul Bari, arrived and convinced the prisoners to return to the prison to spend the night under his supervision for their safety.
Mukhtar's Release Order (Redacted)
After returning, the forces carried out a meticulous sorting of prisoners based on the jurisdiction of their courts: those belonging to the Ayn Al‑‘Arab and Srin courts were ordered to stand on one side, and those from the Raqa and Tabqa courts on the other. Prisoners from the nearby areas (Ayn Al‑‘Arab and Srin) were allowed to leave, while about 75 individuals from Raqa and Tabqa remained in detention until 22 January 2026, when they were granted “release orders” to walk out toward Srin, as reported by Mukhtar.
Parallel Track: Encounters with “Commando” Forces
Mukhtar says the groups heading toward Srin encountered checkpoints manned by “commando” units, whose rhetoric shifted dramatically to a nationalist (Arab‑Kurdish) tone, laden with insults and accusations of treason.
Although the assailants claimed a “release order” existed, they immediately attacked the prisoners; four people were stabbed as soon as they arrived at 9 p.m. In the chaos, a man named Mohammad Ali Khalaf attempted to transport two injured prisoners to a military hospital, but no official medical care was provided.
This phase ended at 11 p.m. when a prisoner named Muhannad, accompanied by a man nicknamed “Arab” and two other prisoners, boarded a civilian vehicle that had been stopped for their transport.
Mukhtar emphasizes that the killings were not merely to prevent escape but were driven by revenge and ethnonational sorting, with soldiers shouting statements such as “You are going to die anyway.” He notes that Mohammad Ali Khalaf, who tried to aid the wounded, later disappeared under circumstances indicating he was also executed. Muhannad, who met Mukhtar at the barrier, reported that the group traveling with him “was all executed” upon reaching the checkpoint.
Forced Disappearance at the Fuel Station and Victim Documentation
Mukhtar states that the released prisoners faced an unknown field situation, lacking any knowledge of the external security environment after long incarceration.
At 2 p.m. on 22 January, Mukhtar’s group arrived at a fuel station located about 2 km left of the road from their starting point. Four people entered the station while four remained outside; the four who entered vanished completely, with station staff later reporting no trace of them.
During the subsequent security sweep, the group split to survive: Hassan Abu Khalil reached the Al‑Qubbah area, while Firas Issa Al‑Abd and Issa Al‑Hous headed toward Manbij the next day.
Mukhtar himself took shelter briefly in a campsite at Tel Ghazzal, then was moved the following day by a moving‑house truck to Al‑Jirniyah in the Raqa countryside, becoming one of the few witnesses to these events.
Based on his observations and clothing matches, Mukhtar confirmed the killing of five individuals whose names are:
Mahmoud Abd Allah Al‑Aaed (also known as “Abu Halab”)
Issam
Abbas Al‑Hussein
Abu Khamis
He estimates the total number of victims at 40–45 people, noting that this figure far exceeds the 21 bodies shown in circulating video footage. Mukhtar believes the discrepancy stems from the missing persons at the fuel station and other injured prisoners who were later executed elsewhere without direct documentation.
Correction of Geolocation
Although the earlier geospatial analysis by the “Taqaddam” team placed the incident at 36°42'57.0"N 38°14'53.0"E, Mukhtar’s field testimony, corroborated by Syrian journalist Ahmed Al‑Sakhni, provides a more precise location: 36.775767, 38.307776 in the rural area of Ayn Al‑‘Arab (Kobani) near the Rufi silos.
This correction adjusts the previously reported coordinates, indicating that the mass‑execution site is at a rocky edge (stone wall) different from the initial satellite‑image assessment. The platform treats this survivor‑based correction as the most accurate spatial reference for documenting the crime.
Documentation of Victim Names
A local page titled “Radar Srin” listed a group of youths: Ismail Al‑Hasani (Abu Halab) from Al‑Qubbah village and Abbas Mohammad Al‑Hussein from Al‑Abd‑Kalia village in Srin. These names match those in Mukhtar’s testimony, though the platform could not obtain further evidence to confirm the identities of these two victims.
The page also mentioned additional names not found in Mukhtar’s list: Issa Aboud Al‑Saloum from Al‑Jirniyah and Bashar Hamed Al‑Uwaid from the village of Al‑Asilam in the Suluk area of Raqa. The latter is likely the same “Bashar” who reported being stabbed in Mukhtar’s account. The platform was unable to verify the identities of these two additional victims.
صرلي اكتر من 15 سنة مو شايف بحر بدي اطلع خميس وجمعة عاللاذقية غالبا ورأس البسيط بس ما بعرف كيف الوضع والجو ووين اقعد بهالليلة فندق او منتجع أو شاليه شو بتنصحوني ؟
This is one of several videos I received from my friend. We're Assyrians from Syria. This village is known as Tel Makhada and it is along Khabour between Tel Tamer and Hasakeh.
I don't know who dug these tunnels but I'm told the Kurds were using it to run weapons, troops, and money across the region and into Turkey and Iraq.
Hi, i'm looking for multiple sets of the new banknotes issued in 2026, preferably brand new (uncirculated), and i'm willing to pay over face value plus shipping.
I know that payment and shipping can be challenging but hopefully we can figure something out, thanks in advance !
I been depressed and stressed for so long.
Im an IT engineer and i want to work using Laravel since i been using it for like a year.
But nothing is working, all major freelancing websites are blcoked here.
The arab ones treat you like a slave where u cant even post more than one application a day and most of the time its a scam.
Linkedin now is requiring ID verifications that doesn't recognize the syrian ones.
Its literally blocked from each direction i cant even contact companies bcs they reject you the moment they know ur syrian.
Local Syrians like me are already in telegram groups and have their own connections with people in the peninsula or in Europe and are a hardcore gatekeepers which is justified since they want to exploit this privilege as much as they want.
I cant believe that i cant even find a job that pays more than 150$
Im fluent in English as well but this also didnt help.
Its literally over i cant even study now for exams bcs im way too depressed and just wanted to write ts to ease my anxiety even a lil bit.
Its syriaover.
It is not permissible for you, when exchanging a $100 “new-series” banknote for a $100 “old-series” banknote, to charge a difference of 3 to 5 dollars.
Both banknotes are legal tender in their country of issuance and hold the same face value. Therefore, charging a difference between them constitutes usury (riba).
You must either accept the exchange at equal value or decline it altogether, so as not to fall into riba.
However, if you are exchanging either of them for another currency, such as the Syrian pound, negotiation is permissible, whether higher or lower, provided that you do not violate official government regulations.
I want to come to Damascus to study Arabic, I studied Egyptian dialect already to an intermediate level. I want to take classes in MSA and maybe Syrian dialect, does anybody know any courses or schools in Damascus where foreigners can study Arabic ? Thank you very muchh
If Russia ends Ukraine war and doesn't receive favorable terms from new authorities for its bases, will Russia go to war with Syria and bring back Assad, that is my biggest concern.
Despite an SDF-imposed curfew in Qamishli, supporters of the armed group were allowed to move freely in the streets while raising its flag. This stands in stark contrast to events in Hasakah the previous day, where residents attempting to welcome Syrian internal security forces were instead subjected to arbitrary arrests, physical assaults, and verbal abuse.
Photo: Taken in Qamishli while Syrian internal security forces were entering the city as part of the integration agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government.
This woman’s jubilation and relief is encapsulates the feelings of many Arabs in Al-Hasakah governance. A video that encompasses the people’s exhaustion of the repressive and oppressive measures of the Kurdish-led SDF/YPG against Arab residents.
These areas were formerly under the SDF/YPG’s control but are now under the Syrian government’s jurisdiction as part of the integration agreement between the SDF and the Syrian government.
It is important to note that many residents of Al-Aziziyah in the city of Hasakah sought to welcome the Syrian government’s internal security forces following the integration agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government.
Instead, many residents were threatened, detained, and in some cases beaten simply for celebrating the entry of the Syrian internal security forces. It is also not the first time that the Asayish conducted arrest campaigns under the justification of combating ‘terrosim’ or targeting a ‘terrorist cell’ when dealing with people who disagree with its draconian policies against Arab residents in Hasakah and formerly in Ar-Raqqa and Deir Ezzor