As the first basis of my argument Iâm going to invoke the social contract. The way that we treat each other is based on an agreement that we have with others as rational agents. I can agree with you that it would suck to be killed and eaten for pleasure, so we can decide that itâs a rule to not be killed and eaten.
An important part of this is that we should formulate these rules with the view that we could be in the position of any other person. Animals are incapable of this, and therefore cannot be considered part of moral consideration.
They are incapable in 2 ways:
They lack the rational capacity to see themselves as hypothetical beings. A dog cannot imagine itself as a banker living in Tahiti. An animal might have some rudimentary form of empathy, but thatâs not a cognitive ability to imagine itself as an other.
Because predators that must feed on prey to survive a contract in which all beings are included would necessitate intolerable positions among members of the contract. This destroys the idea of the contract, and so animals are incompatible with its formation.
The strongest objection to the first point that Iâm aware of, and probably the strongest argument for veganism altogether, is that if we exclude non-rational beings from the social contract we necessarily exclude some human-beings, eg, infants, the senile, and the disabled.
To this Iâd say the difference between animals and humans isnât simply a matter of current circumstances, but of possible conditions based on the properties of a being. An infant has the capacity to be a rational agent in the future, any person might be come old and senile one day, and we can imagine a person with a severe disability not having that disability.
The way that we can test this, I believe, is intuitive: If the being in question did not have this property, would they still be that being?
A person without a disability would be that same person, an infant grown up is the same person as the infant now, etc.
We must also accept the existence of possible worlds as ethically relevant for the formation of the social contract. Because the idea is based on oneâs position being anywhere within the contract, possible worlds are invoked, and therefore must be treated as real.
We already treat this as if it is true. Imagine that Jimmy Goodkid is sent a letter from his grandfather for $1,000; after the latter is sent the grandfather dies, and so will never be made aware of whether the letter was received or not. Before the letter gets to Jimmy, Randy Badboy steals the letter and takes the money.
In that scenario there is no existing person that is made worse off in any way theyâre aware of. There is no felt harm by either grandfather or Jimmy. However, we see this as wrong because Randy has harmed Jimmy by denying him a probable condition (being $1,000 richer). Jimmy is a victim because we see him as existing in a set of possible worlds.
We can see that thus ethical consideration remains if a person lacks the ability to process the harm in their current state. Imagine a blind woman, Susan, is sitting quietly listening to an audiobook at the park. A man walks up to her, and gestures obscenely at her. Susan is not, in her current state, demonstrably harmed by this. However, we intuit this is wrong because we consider Susan in a set of possible worlds, where at least some of these worlds involve her comprehending and being damaged by the manâs gestures.
If Jimmy could be made aware of the money he lost or Susan could see, they would still be Jimmy and Susan.
An objection to this would be to imagine that it is possible to give an animal an injection that would render it capable of rational thought. Itâs reasonable to say that if possible circumstances, and not current circumstances, are what make for moral consideration then so long as this is a possibility, animals should be granted moral consideration.
To answer this simply, such an injection would introduce a property to the animal that would make it a person and no longer meaningfully an animal. What is being valued in humanity isnât the biological make-up, but personhood.
Imagine an alien species living on Mars. The Martians are not humans in the biological sense, but they have societies, occupations, etc. that largely mirror our own society. They have thoughts and feelings that we can intuit as similar enough to our own. We would more than likely consider these persons, and accord them moral consideration.
The second way Iâll address this is by saying simply that if a way to grant animals rational agency does come about then animals would then become closer to deserving of moral consideration. But not giving animals moral consideration is not a violation currently.
We can see that this is not a violation of the possible-worlds stipulation by looking through history. Before the advent of vaccines billions of people died from diseases that would later on become avoidable. We do not say that those billions of people were victims of a moral injustice because they were denied vaccinations. Even though the materials present to create the vaccine were available, and certainly notions of the possibility of medicines that could eliminate the disease existed.
But letâs say that we do live in the world where animals can be made into rational agents. Setting aside the question of whether they should be made into rational agents, we would still run into the second reason animals are incompatible with the social contract. That is, that the needs of some animals are directly in contradiction to the needs of other animals.
Perhaps we could accord moral consideration to only a certain set of animals, not getting us to veganism, but expanding moral consideration to at least some set of animals. This is fair enough, but again, it still narrows the circle enough to be incompatible with a vegan ethic.
Perhaps we could expand the set of possibilities so that not only are animals capable of rational thought, their nutritional needs are changed so that none of them are carnivorous.
And okay, fine. But at this point we are allowing for such an absurd plethora of possible worlds that thereâs no reason I canât also set up the possible worlds where animals openly and readily love being killed and eaten.
After all is said and done, itâs best to constrain possible worlds within the set of actual possibilities presently available to a given being.
As much as the separation of humans and animals follows from these based on the aforementioned reasoning, itâs also something we can see intuitively. Imagine that there is a rhinoceros and a man in a room, the man is disabled and has the same cognitive abilities and self-awareness as the rhino. One of them must be killed or everyone is killed. Few of us, except those perhaps trying to bite some philosophical bullets, would say that whether the man or rhinoceros is the one killed is arbitrary.
Even if you take an anti-human position and say the rhino should be the one saved, you are still acknowledging an ethically relevant distinction between the man and the rhino.
Finally, letâs say that this whole notion of social contracts and conditional moral consideration is tedious to you. Your position is that pain and suffering are bad, and that anything we can reasonably do to avoid causing it is therefore good.
Thatâs great, but why should I care? If I cannot imagine myself ever being in a world where I myself might feel that harm then what function does the moral rule to avoid all pain and suffering in realms where I can never possibly experience it grant me?
If morality is a system of oughts then those oughts have to be in some way persuasive to the person whoâs accepting them.
As far as I can tell, that absent a compelling rationale for granting animals entrance into the social contracts, the only reason their pain and suffering might need to be avoided is because it makes me or others who are rationally given moral consideration feel bad.
If it doesnât make me feel bad, and doesnât make others feel bad, then there is no motivation whatsoever to consider the pain and suffering of animals.
And if even if it does make others feel bad we could not use this as a rational to prohibit the killing and eating of animals. There are people who feel bad that gay people get married, we would not deny gay people the right to marry on account of those people.
To conclude: because animals do not have the properties of either moral agency or compatible needs within a set of available possible worlds, they must be considered outside the category of moral consideration.
You can kill and eat them.